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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LEWIS RICKY YATES, 
Defendant/Appellant -
Case No. 950444-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Lewis Ricky Yates ("Yates") submits 
this brief in reply to the State's brief filed in this case. 
Issues not addressed in this reply brief were adequately covered 
in Yates' opening brief or do not otherwise require response. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. CONTROLLING CASE LAW REQUIRES THAT YATES 
BE SENTENCED FOR A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR WHERE THE 
CLASS B PENALTY WAS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF 
SENTENCING. 
A. CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE STATE'S 
"BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN" CLAIM, NOR IS 
CONTROLLING CASE LAW DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The State does not cite any case law in support of its 
position that the class A misdemeanor sentence was proper 
"because it gives to both parties the benefit of their plea 
bargain." State's brief at 12. Indeed, the only case cited by 
the State which discusses the benefit of a plea bargain is State 
v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-76 (Utah 1988).1 Copeland 
focuses on a defendant's right to the benefit of the bargain made 
by the State and holds that a "defendant must be allowed to 
withdraw his plea if the State made a promise it did not or could 
not fulfill." Id. at 1276. Copeland does not hold or indicate 
in dictum that the State has the right to the benefit of its 
bargain, as claimed by the State in this case. Nor does Copeland 
require that a plea bargain be enforced. Hence, the State's 
"benefit of the bargain" argument for upholding the class A 
misdemeanor sentence is without legal basis.2 
The State attempts unsuccessfully to distinguish the 
controlling decisions in State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334, 335-36 
(Utah 1971); Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971); and State 
v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 1340, 1340-41 (Utah 1974), by arguing that in 
those cases, the facts were either established or undisputed and 
the lower penalty was therefore appropriate. State's brief at 
10-11. A review of the controlling cases demonstrates, however, 
that those decisions were grounded on the nature of the crime for 
which the defendant was convicted and not on any arguable 
1
 The State appears to recognize that Copeland does not 
directly support its position by citing Copeland comparatively with 
a parenthetical comment that Copeland "vacat[es] a plea because the 
State's agreement had no real value for the defendant." State's 
brief at 9. 
2
 The "bargain" in this case was that defendant agree to 
plead guilty to a theft crime which had as one of its elements the 
taking of property valued at between $100 and $250. The State 
received the benefit of that bargain. The only question raised is 
the nature of the punishment which should be imposed as the result 
of that guilty plea. 
2 
undisputed or established nature of the underlying charges. In 
addition, nothing in the Belt decision supports the State's 
claim. 
Belt pled guilty to issuing a fraudulent check in the 
amount of $10. The degree of punishment for such crime is 
determined by the amount of the check, making the circumstances 
in Belt substantially similar to those in the present case. The 
Belt opinion does not indicate whether Belt pled as charged in 
the Information or entered into a plea bargain whereby he pled to 
a charge based on a lesser dollar amount. Without such 
information, the State is merely speculating that the dollar 
amount was not disputed in Belt. 
None of the controlling Utah cases relied on the 
establishment or lack of dispute as to facts as the basis for 
requiring the imposition of the lower penalty which was 
established by new legislation. Instead, as set forth more fully 
in Appellant's opening brief at 6-10, the decisions in Belt, Tapp 
and Saxton relied on the rationale that the legislature had 
adopted a new policy concerning the punishment for the offense at 
issue, and that since the legislature had determined that a lower 
penalty was appropriate for the offenses, such new policy "should 
inure to the defendant's benefit." Belt, 479 P.2d at 792; see 
also In re Fink, 433 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1967) (stating that rationale 
for amendment to sentencing statute is that lesser penalty is 
proper for prohibited act; defendant's conduct in extending time 
for sentencing beyond effective date of statute is immaterial). 
3 
The State's argument that because it claimed the dollar 
amount exceeded $1000, Yates should be punished under the old 
statute disregards the elements of the crime for which Yates was 
convicted. The elements of the crime for which Yates was 
convicted include an element that the value of the property was 
between $100 and $250. R. 18, 73; see Addendum A. Pursuant to 
the version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 which was in effect at 
the time of sentencing, the class B misdemeanor penalty applies 
to a theft offense involving property of equivalent value. Belt 
v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971), State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 
1340, 1342 (Utah 1971) and State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 
1971), all of which are binding on this Court, require that a 
defendant be sentenced under a lesser penalty for the offense of 
which he is convicted where such lesser penalty is in effect at 
the time of sentencing. None of these cases allow sentencing for 
a greater penalty where the parties continue to dispute the 
amount of restitution due. Nor does the State cite any cases 
from other jurisdictions which have embraced its argument for 
sentencing Yates under the greater penalty. 
The State's claim that the value of the property exceeded 
one thousand dollars is irrelevant to a determination of the 
nature of the crime for which Yates was convicted in this case. 
See People v. Palmer, 595 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Colo. App. 1979) 
(finding that defendant's statement as to how much marijuana he 
had is irrelevant; nature of the crime to which he pled guilty 
controls). The crime to which Yates pled guilty included an 
4 
element that the value of the property was between $100 and $250. 
The elements outlined in the plea colloquy and plea affidavit 
define the nature of the crime for which Yates was convicted in 
this case. See Id. 
In addition, the record does not establish that the 
amount taken actually exceeded $1000. The record indicates that 
Yates disagreed with the State's claim as to the value of the 
property. The State indicated prior to the entry of Yates' 
guilty plea that his file showed restitution in the amount of 
$1235. R. 68. The prosecutor then asked, apparently to defense 
counsel, "[d]oes that sound correct to you?" R. 68. Defense 
counsel responded: 
The exact amount may require a hearing, 
Your Honor. At the preliminary hearing the 
victim testified that Ricky was living in her 
home, and left when she kicked him out hurriedly. 
Their property became intermingled, and I'm not 
sure exactly how much he took. And she's 
actually holding a good deal of his property 
hostage. 
R. 69; see Addendum A for transcript of R. 68-9. 
During sentencing, defense counsel again indicated that 
Yates' girlfriend continued to hold some of his belongings, 
including his bed which had belonged to his grandmother. R. 13 0. 
Defense counsel also took issue with the amount of restitution 
claimed by the State, pointing out that !l[t]here was some 
indication in the preliminary hearing that the value of the items 
was overpriced, and if Ms. Coumier was able to convince the 
insurance company that these goods were worth more than they 
were, then I don't think Mr. Yates should have to suffer for 
5 
that." R. 138; see Addendum A. 
A complete review of the record indicates that the State 
did not establish that the value of the property exceeded $250. 
Even if the State's claim were correct that Yates should be 
sentenced as a class A misdemeanor based on the value of the 
property, its failure to establish the value of the property 
would preclude the success of such an argument. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENT 
AND REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S SENTENCE. 
Without directly confessing error, the State recognizes 
in a separate point "that the Utah Supreme Court has given 
defendants the benefit of a lower penalty even where their own 
conduct delayed the sentencing beyond the effective date of the 
statutory amendments lowering the penalty. [citation omitted]." 
State's brief at 13. The State nevertheless asks that "the rule 
[] be limited to exclude situations, such as this, where the 
delay in sentencing beyond the effective date of the reduced 
penalty results from defendant's failure to appear for prior 
sentencing hearings." State's brief at 13. The State 
acknowledges, however, that this Court is bound by precedent from 
the Utah Supreme Court which requires that a defendant be given 
the lesser sentence even where s/he failed to appear or was 
otherwise responsible for the delay in sentencing.3 State's 
3
 The record does not establish that Yates is wholly 
responsible for the delay in sentencing beyond the effective date 
of the new statute. Yates was in court on March 13, 1995. R. 44. 
The statute changing the classification for theft offenses was 
6 
brief at 13. The State requests, however, that this Court avoid 
the binding precedent by certifying this case to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Rule 43, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
State's brief at 13-14. 
The State correctly acknowledges that in both Saxton and 
Belt, the delay in sentencing until after the lower penalty went 
into effect was apparently attributable to the defendant. In 
Saxton, the defendant failed to appear at sentencing on 
August 26, 1971. He was not heard from again until May 1972, 
when the district attorney learned that the defendant was in 
prison in California. Saxton was not returned to Utah and 
sentenced until July 31, 1973. The new statute containing the 
lesser penalty went into effect on July 1, 1973, almost two years 
after the defendant failed to appear at sentencing. 
Nevertheless, for reasons outlined more fully in Appellant's 
opening brief at 6-10, the Supreme Court held that Saxton was 
entitled to the lesser sentence. See also Belt v. Turner, 479 
P.2d at 793 (finding that defendant be sentenced to lesser 
penalty in effect at time of sentencing even though defendant 
improperly left the state prior to sentencing). 
By comparison, Yates was booked on this charge on 
December 6, 1994. R. 02. He was sentenced six and a half months 
amended prior to that date, in February 1995. The trial judge 
reset sentencing and held Yates so that she could obtain a 
presentence report. When the trial judge ultimately sentenced 
Yates, she sentenced him to the maximum allowable incarceration 
period for a class A misdemeanor without giving him credit for time 
served. See also Appellant's opening brief at 11. 
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later, on June 28, 1995. R. 81. The length of time required for 
resolution of this case was minimal when compared to Saxton. 
Just as Saxton was sentenced under the lesser penalty despite his 
failure to appear at sentencing, the trial judge was required to 
sentence Yates under the lesser class B penalty. 
Rather than confessing error, the State asks this Court 
to certify this case to the Supreme Court. Such a certification 
would not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and would 
undermine the important role played by precedent in the Utah 
court system. In the absence of a compelling reason from the 
State, other than its claim that the controlling decisions are 
old and do not seem fair to the State, this Court should resist 
certification where controlling case law clearly resolves the 
issue. 
First, Yates is in custody on this case, serving a 
purportedly illegal sentence. The case is briefed in this Court 
and could be resolved fairly quickly due to the existence of 
controlling case law. The State would be free to petition for a 
writ of certiorari under usual appellate procedures if it is 
dissatisfied with this Court's resolution of the issue. 
Second, the State's request for certification does not 
comply with the procedure mandated in Rule 43, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rather than filing a motion for 
certification as required by the rule, the State makes its 
request for certification as part of the briefing in this case. 
A motion earlier in the proceedings would have moved this case 
8 
along faster for this in-custody defendant. If this case were to 
be certified to the Supreme Court, further briefing would be 
required to address the issue of whether existing case law should 
be overruled, thereby requiring additional delay in this case. 
In addition, the State's request does not outline either 
of the criteria for transfer mandated in subsection (c) of the 
rule. For this Court to take the extraordinary step of 
certifying a case to the Supreme Court, it should require the 
State to establish that the case fits within the criteria of 
Rule 43(c)4. Without establishing those criteria, a 
certification would override the important function of stare 
decisis. 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of 
binding precedent in at least two recent opinions. In State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994), the Supreme Court 
noted that the doctrine of stare decisis has two facets in its 
application to this Court. "Vertical stare decisis" compels this 
Court to strictly follow the decisions rendered by the Supreme 
4
 Rule 43(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
(c) Criteria for transfer. The Court of Appeals shall 
consider certification only in the following cases: 
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is 
apparent that the case should be decided by the Supreme 
Court and that the Supreme Court would probably grant a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if decided by 
the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of 
Appeals might rule, and 
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other 
cases involving the same legal issue or issues pending in 
the district courts, juvenile courts, circuit courts, or 
the Court of Appeals or which are cases of first impression 
under state or federal law which will have wide 
applicability. 
9 
Court. Id. This includes holdings and dicta which have been 
announced by that court. Id. 
The Court also considered the importance of precedent, in 
the context of horizontal stare decisis, in State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). The Court pointed out that the 
doctrine of stare decisis 
is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence 
that is crucial to the predictability of the law 
and the fairness of adjudication. [citation 
omitted]. The very viability of the common law 
depends in large part on the doctrine. "[N]o 
judicial system could do society's work if it 
eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised 
it." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 
2971, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674, 699-700 (1992) 
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.) 
(citing Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process 149 (1921). 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1269. 
Precedent from the Utah Supreme Court requires reversal 
of the trial court's sentence in this case. The State has not 
offered any legal basis for overruling Tapp, Belt and Saxton. 
Nor has it presented this Court with case law from other 
jurisdictions which supports its position that a defendant who is 
responsible for a delay in sentencing should not be given the 
benefit of the lesser penalty at sentencing. By contrast, 
Appellant's opening brief at 12-15 cites several cases from other 
jurisdictions which reach a result similar to the result reached 
in the Utah cases. Those cases hold that the defendant must be 
sentenced to the lower penalty even though the defendant may have 
been responsible for the delay in sentencing. See, e.g., People 
10 
v. Palmer, 595 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Colo. App. 1979) (stating that 
defendant is entitled to reduction in penalty for possession 
despite his failure to appear for sentencing); In re Fink, 433 
P.2d 161 (Cal. 1967) . 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Lewis Ricky Yates respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the judgment and remand the case 
with an order directing the trial court to enter a correct 
class B misdemeanor sentence. 
SUBMITTED this *3\JL day of February, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
REBECCA HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
11 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
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City, Utah 84114, this <33./ul day of February, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of February, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
Ism,? T^lk Inrfl^ Jf/Ajj^jJ v.j,f/TiJt.nu^f/^kn 
to 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons (for which I am criminally liable, 
that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
(/HAH* /W; f 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I 
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to 
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
l< i> 0 0 1 1 
MS. HUNT: The exact amount may require a 
hearing, Your Honor. At the preliminary hearing the 
victim testified that Ricky was living in her home, and 
left when she kicked him out very hurriedly. Their 
property became intermingled, and I'm not sure exactly how 
much he took. And she's actually holding a good deal of 
his property hostage. 
THE COURT: Well, full restitution in an amount 
to be determined, then. Your understanding, however, 
Mr. Nolan, is consistent with the rest of counsel's 
representation? 
MR. NOLAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have a motion to make? 
MR. NOLAN: Your Honor, we would move to amend 
the information to a theft, a class A misdemeanor, between 
$100 and $250. 
THE COURT: Do you accept that amendment by 
interlineation, counsel? 
MS. HUNT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you waive the filing of a 
formal written amended information and a new arraignment? 
MS. HUNT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Sir, what is the 
highest level of education you've completed? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have a few associate degrees, 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
0 0 0 0 fi <? 
guilty. Can you tell me in your own words what you did on 
October 22nd at 1260 West Pacific Avenue? 
THE DEFENDANT: I was more or less forced to 
move from the residence of my girlfriend and her mother's, 
and I have gone, I was living in the garage. Some of her 
tools were intermingled with mine, and she says that I- -
THE COURT: That isn't a crime, sir. Let's get 
down to the nitty-gritty. Did you, as a party to the 
offense, exercise or take unauthorized—that means no one 
gave you permission—control over some property of 
another, in this case Raylynn Coumier? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And did you do that with the 
purpose to deprive her of that property? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And the property at issue was worth 
less than $250, and more than $100. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. If you plead guilty 
today, I'm going to be expecting that you are, in fact, 
guilty of this crime. Is that your expectation? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. You heard me go over 
the rights of Ms. Vilano, the last person who entered a 
change of plea in 951900017. Is that correct? 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
ia A A n ^ s 
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to go and obtain Richard Russell, that the taxpayer should 
be reimbursed appropriately, and not simply kind of a pro 
forma $100 or $150 for recoupment fee. We think it ought 
to be an appropriate amount, and we would suggest $500 to 
the court. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Ms. Hyde? 
MS. HYDE: Yes, Your Honor. We certainly have 
no objections to the $250 deductible paid to Mrs. Coumier 
in restitution. And we believe that would be appropriate. 
I do not think that the $900 payment of restitution to the 
insurance company is appropriate in this matter. There 
was some indication in the preliminary hearing that the 
value of the items were overpriced, and if Ms. Coumier was 
able to convince the insurance company that these goods 
were worth more than they were, then I don't think that 
Mr. Yates should have to suffer for that. 
Additionally, there was one other restitution 
issue brought up here in the presentence issue. The state 
didn't bring it up, but I recall now I should probably 
address that. Apparently, based on these allegations of 
threats by Mr. Yates with a knife, they are seeking 
counseling, and have put in a request of Victim's 
Reparation to pay for that counseling. 
Again, Your Honor, that's an unsubstantiated, 
uncharged claim, and I don't think Mr. Yates should be 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT u A n i o c 
